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the industry is in such trouble, steelworkers should help it by granting concessions on wages and work 
rules. 
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Would Wage Concessions Help 
the Steel Industry? 
by Jack Metzgar 
Roosevelt University, Chicago 
The American steel industry is dying. 
150,000 steelworkers are laid off, and 
thousands of them will never work in 
steel again. The steel companies will 
report losses of some $2 billion for 1982, 
and Wall Street analysts predict— 
advocate—that as much as 20 per cent of 
the industry's primary capacity will be 
eliminated. The loss of steel jobs 
threatens more than a dozen local and 
regional economies with decades of 
Depression-like conditions. And the 
worst is not likely to be over soon. 
Even though most people recognize 
that the primary cause of this situation 
is the misguided and mean-spirited 
policies of the Reagan administration, 
public opinion seems to have accepted a 
simple logic: If the industry is in such 
trouble, steelworkers should help it by 
granting concessions on wages and 
work rules. 
But it's not that simple. The 
immediate crisis in steel was brought on 
by Reaganomics' wild experiment with 
a government-imposed "free market." 
But the industry's root problems are 
deep, serious and long-term. They will 
not be solved by steelworkers' giving 
back what it has taken them more than 
40 years to win. 
In fact, though there are important 
differences among the various 
companies, in general any additional 
money the companies get through wage 
concessions is more likely to stimulate 
them to get out of steel than it is to help 
save the industry. Concessions may 
help the companies, their managers and 
stockholders, but they will not 
necessarily help "the industry." 
What is "the steel industry"? And 
who is in trouble when it is in trouble? 
The steel industry is not simply the 
list of companies whose principal 
business is making steel. Among those 
companies, the worse things get in 
steel, the more likely they are to 
abandon the industry—the less likely 
they are to "throw good money after 
bad" by investing in the modernization 
program the industry so badly needs. 
No, the steel companies are not the steel 
industry. As its chairman David 
Roderick has said, "U.S. Steel is not in 
the business of making steel. It is in the 
business of making money." 
Because the steel companies are not 
synonymous with the steel industry, 
the people who own and control those 
companies are not in trouble. 
The top management of the 
companies, for example, is doing quite 
well despite the industry's troubles. 
Their total compensation (salaries, 
bonuses and other cash benefits) 
increased in 1981 from 17 per cent to 97 
per cent. Their "wages" range from 
$300,000 to over $1 million a year. Their 
jobs are secure, at least so long as they 
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Annual Salaries, Supplementary Compensation, Fees, and Other 
Cash Compenstation for the Top Executive Officers 
of Four Steel Companies 
1980 
$452,403 
$270,706 
$248,201 
$280,880 
$239,954 
$430,000 
$237,496 
$240,840 
$188,936 
$172,326 
$791,555 
$678,425 
$408,300 
$347,063 
$609,167 
$504,167 
$345,417 
$250,000 
1981 
Retired 
$327,710 
$349,284 
$555,986 
$416,931 
$505,000 
$280,000 
$305,000 
— 
$208,336 
$1,163,622 
$995,694 
$661,073 
$485,074 
$783,750 
$650,000 
$446,250 
$335,000 
% Increase 
21% 
40.7% 
97.9% 
73.7% 
17.4% 
17.9% 
26.7% 
— 
21% 
47% 
54.8% 
61.9% 
39.8% 
28.7% 
28.9% 
29.2% 
34% 
Bethlehem Steel 
Lewis W. Foy 
Chairman of the Board 
C. William Ritterhoff 
Executive Vice President 
Richard M. Smith 
Vice Chairman of the Board 
Donald H. Trautlein 
Chairman of the Board 
Walter F. Williams 
President 
Inland Steel 
Frederick G. Jaicks 
Chairman of the Board 
Raymond N. Carlen 
Vice Chairman of the Board 
Frank W. Luerssen 
President 
Derrick L. Brewster 
Vice President—Sales 
O. Robert Nottelman 
Sen/or Vice President 
LTV-J & L Steel 
Paul Thayer 
Chairman of the Board 
Raymond Hay 
President of LTV 
Thomas Graham 
President of J & L Steel 
James J. Paulos 
Senior Vice President 
U.S. Steel 
David M. Roderick 
Chairman of the Board 
William R. Roesch 
President 
W. Bruce Thomas 
Executive Vice President 
M. G. Heatwole 
General Counsel 
Source: Stockholders' Proxy Statements. 
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fulfill their basic responsibilities. And 
their most basic responsibility is not to 
build a strong steel industry, but to 
make money for their companies' 
stockholders. 
The stockholders are doing all right, 
too. Though again, there are important 
differences among the various 
companies, holders of steel company 
stocks do not generally experience the 
same kind of cyclical industry that 
steelworkers and steel communities do. 
They get their dividends no matter how 
much steel is being produced in South 
Chicago or Lackawanna. Though 
dividends are higher in good years and 
lower in bad ones, they do not fluctuate 
nearly as much as do production, jobs 
or even profits. In 1977, for example, 
the industry's profits decreased by 98 
per cent, but total dividends decreased 
only 13 per cent; in that year, the entire 
industry made only $22 million in after-
tax profits, but the companies paid out 
$555 million in dividends. (See the table 
on "Profit Rates & Cash Flow....") 
The steel industry is not the steel 
companies. The industry is the total 
collection of material, capital and human 
resources which are engaged in making steel 
and primary steel products. Though the 
steel companies are necessarily affected 
by the industry and though some of 
them may also be in trouble because of 
the condition of the industry, to say that 
the industry's problems are deep, 
serious and long-term is to say nothing 
about any individual steel company. 
And, it has nothing to do with what 
stocks you should invest in. That the 
steel industry is in serious trouble 
directly affects only two groups of 
people: steelworkers and people who 
live in communities Whose economies 
" . . . their most basic 
responsibility is not to 
build a strong steel 
industry, but to make more 
money for their companies' 
stockholders." 
are built around steel. 
These groups are the only ones who 
have a vested interest in helping the 
industry, and in the past they have tried 
to do that by helping the companies. 
Steel communities are lenient with tax 
assessments, for example, and 
steelworkers increase their productivity 
even as the equipment they work with 
grows more ancient. Both groups have 
provided the essential political support 
for the companies' various schemes to 
get more money from the federal 
government. In the past this made some 
sense: As long as the mills were 
producing and the companies were 
profitable, everybody benefited. 
But the crisis in the industry has 
changed this equation. The very depth 
and seriousness of the industry's 
problems now make helping the 
companies a risky business. To see 
why, we need to take a closer look at the 
industry's basic problem. 
The industry's basic problem is that it 
is not "profitable." That's what the 
companies say and that's what business 
analysts say. And, in terms of what they 
understand by "profitability," they're 
right. 
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Profit Rates and Cash Flow 
in the American Steel Industry 
(in millions of dollars) 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Rate of 
Profit1 
9.4% 
15.4 
14.1 
13.1 
8.3 
8.4 
7.9 
6.5 
5.3 
7.3 
9.0 
9.4 
8.9 
6.9 
8.2 
7.0 
4.1 
4.3 
5.8 
9.3 
17.1 
9.8 
7.8 
0.1 
7.3 
6.5 
9.6 
13.3 
Profits 
After Taxes 
$ 637 
1,099 
1,113 
1,132 
788 
831 
811 
690 
566 
782 
992 
1,069 
1,075 
830 
992 
879 
532 
653 
775 
1,272 
2,475 
1,595 
1,337 
22 
1,292 
1,154 
1,735 
2,584 
Depreciation, 
Depletion, 
etc.2 
$ 703 
783 
794 
816 
713 
653 
840 
749 
958 
1,034 
1,046 
1,117 
1,199 
1,444 
1,316 
1,173 
1,128 
1,123 
1,196 
1,329 
1,553 
1,591 
1,614 
1,888 
2,010 
2,453 
2,290 
3,000 
Gross 
Cash Flow 
$ 1,340 
1,882 
1,907 
1,948 
1,501 
1,484 
1,651 
1,439 
1,524 
1,816 
2,038 
2,186 
2,274 
2,274 
2,308 
2,052 
1,660 
1,686 
1,971 
2,601 
4,028 
3,186 
2,951 
1,910 
3,302 
3,607 
4,025 
5,584 
Cash 
Dividends 
$ 343 
437 
508 
566 
540 
553 
564 
557 
508 
443 
462 
468 
483 
481 
452 
489 
488 
390 
402 
443 
674 
658 
637 
555 
533 
593 
630 
659 
Net 
Cash Flow 
$ 997 
1,445 
1,399 
1,382 
961 
931 
1,087 
882 
1,016 
1,373 
1,576 
1,718 
1,791 
1,793 
1,856 
1,563 
1,172 
1,296 
1,569 
2,158 
3,354 
2,528 
2,314 
1,355 
2,769 
3,014 
3,395 
4,925 
Capital 
Expenditures 
$ 609 
714 
1,311 
1,723 
1,136 
934 
1,521 
960 
911 
1,040 
1,600 
1,823 
1,953 
2,146 
2,307 
2,047 
1,736 
1,425 
1,174 
1,400 
2,115 
3,179 
3,253 
2,850 
2,538 
3,312 
3,390 
3,451 
Sources: For 1954-1978, American Iron and Steel Institute, Steel at the Crossroads, pp. 89-90. For 1979-1981, American Iron and Steel Institute, 
Annual Statistical Report 1981, p. 9. 
1
 Profits After Taxes as percentage of stockholders' equity, based on equity at the beginning of the year. 
2
 Includes changes in reserves. 
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That the industry is not "profitable" 
is not immediately apparent to those of 
us who are not corporate managers or 
private investors. Look at the Cash Flow 
data (see appendix beginning on page 
36). The industry generally makes over 
$1 billion a year in after-tax profits. In 
1974 (the industry's best year in 3 
decades) and again in 1981, it cleared 
around $2.5 billion. That's a lot of 
money, but it is not enough for the 
industry to be considered "profitable." 
In business investment, whether an 
industry is "profitable" depends on its 
rate of profit in comparison with other 
potential investments. While the 
companies had an exceptionally good 
year in 1981, the steel industry's average 
rate of profit is around 8 per cent, while 
the average rate in all manufacturing is 
close to 15 per cent, and the average rate 
economy-wide in the past 10 years has 
been 18 per cent. 
If I invest $100 and I get $108 back 
from that investment, in common sense 
terms my investment has been "profit-
able." But for a corporate manager or a 
private investor, if that same $100 could 
have made $115 by my investing in 
something else, then the first 
investment is not "profitable." 
You can see, then, why the industry's 
rate of profit is a problem for corporate 
managers since their responsibility is to 
maximize profits. But the industry is still 
profitable in ordinary terms and it has 
billions of dollars to reinvest in the new 
technology that would make the 
industry competitive with steel 
industries in Japan, Europe and the 
Third World, right? 
Well, yes and no. In fact, the 
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industry's main source of money 
available for reinvestment is not its 
reported profits, but the cash it gets 
from depreciation allowances (which 
are not reported as part of profits). Look 
at the Cash Flow data. 
Money from depreciation allowances 
is almost always higher than money 
from profits and it is much more consis-
tent. Profits fluctuate from year to year, 
often dramatically, but cash flow from 
depreciation allowances almost always 
increases (look at 1976 and 1977, for 
example). 
From 1979 through 1981, the 
industry's net cast flow (profits plus cash 
from depreciation allowances, minus 
what it pays out to stockholders in 
dividends) has averaged $3.8 billion. 
Again, that's a lot of money, but it's 
not enough to modernize the industry. 
And, unless the industry is thoroughly 
modernized, it will not be "profitable" 
in the business sense, and the 
companies will increasingly put their 
money elsewhere. 
The American Iron and Steel Institute 
(AISI) has estimated that a thorough 
modernization program would require 
an investment of $7 billion a year for 10 
years from 1979 through 1988. As we 
saw above, the industry's net cash flow 
for the first three of those years was 
slightly more than half of what AISI 
said is needed. Though AISI's estimate 
of the industry's capital needs is on the 
high side, by all estimates the industry 
does not have nearly enough money to 
engage in a thorough modernization 
program (see Appendix for a more 
detailed treatment of this subject). 
Convinced of this "capital shortage" 
in the steel industry, the federal govern-
ment (in both the Carter and Reagan 
administrations) has sought to get more 
money to the steel companies and to 
Capital Expenditures in Steel 
(dollars in millions, figures in parantheses are millions of 1979 dollars) 
%/year is the change from the previous year and % total is the percentage of total company investment that went into steel. 
1981 %/'80 % total 1980 %/'79 % total 1979 % total 
Armco 
Bethlehem 
Inland 
LTVO&L) 
National 
Republic1 
U.S. Steel 
$220.7 
(176.1) 
393.5 
(314.0) 
115.9 
(92.5) 
239.7 
(191.3) 
186.1 
(148.5) 
299.2 
(238.8) 
408.6 
(326.1) 
110 
-12 
-13 
23 
-30 
-14 
-17 
56 
86 
90 
64 
90 
— 
48 
$105 
(92.5) 
448.8 
(395.3) 
221.2 
(194.9) 
193.5 
(170.4) 
265.3 
(233.7) 
346.4 
305.1 
448.8 
(395.3) 
47 
28 
-15 
-31 
32 
2 
-5 
38 
89 
92 
85 
90 
— 
66 
$71.2 
349.7 
261.5 
279.6 
200.5 
341.1 
521.1 
44 
84 
92 
88 
88 
53 
1
 Republic did not breakdown their areas of investment in their annual report. 
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improve their profit rates. Corporate 
taxes were slashed, more generous 
depreciation allowances granted, and 
EPA and OSHA requirements were 
"relaxed." This helped the companies 
achieve in 1981 the highest net cash 
flow they have ever had ($4.9 billion) 
and their second best rate of profit in 
the past 25 years. But, still they were 
well short of what they need every year 
to thoroughly modernize the industry. 
And this is the problem: Even in the 
best of times, the companies can't 
accumulate enough money to modern-
ize the industry and make it 
"profitable." And the clearer this 
becomes to them, the less likely they are 
to invest in the industry with whatever 
money they can lay their hands on. 
Look what happened in 1981. What 
did the companies do with their record 
profits? 
Different companies did different 
things. U.S. Steel, for example, used its 
increased 1981 cash flow to leverage its 
1982 purchase of Marathon Oil. Among 
the top seven companies, only Armco 
and LTV (J & L) increased the level of 
their investments in steel. U.S., 
Bethlehem, Inland, National and 
Republic actually decreased their steel 
investments. 
For the industry as a whole, while the 
companies decreased their capital 
expenditures in steel by about $250 
million or 9 per cent, they increased 
their non-steel investments by $311 
million or 44 per cent. From 1979 to 
1981, the percentage of the companies' 
investment in steel has dropped from 77 
per cejit to almost 70 per cent. Non-steel 
assets have increased during the same 
period from 29 per cent to nearly 40 per 
cent. And these industry-wide figures 
Steel vs. 
Other Company Businesses 
(millions of dollars) 
1981 1980 1979 
$29,525.2 
17,934.1 
$47,459.3 
62.2 
$ 2,434.4 
1,016.8 
$28,872.3 
14,824.6 
$43,696.9 
66.1 
$ 2,684.2 
705.4 
$28,594.6 
11,594.7 
$40,189.3 
71.1 
$ 2,547.9 
764.0 
Identifiable Assets 
Steel Segment 
All Other Segments 
Total 
% Steel of Total 
Capital Expenditures 
Steel Segment 
All Other Segments 
Total $ 3,451.2 $ 3,389.6 $ 3,311.9 
% Steel of Total 70.5 79.1 76.9 
Note: Steel segment generally includes raw materials operations dedicated to 
the support of steel operations. All other segments include corporate items not 
allocated to operating segments. 
Source: American Iron & Steel Institute, Annual Statistical Report 1981, p. 13a. 
for 1981 do not include the entry of 
Marathon Oil into the "steel industry." 
A clear picture has begun to emerge: 
Though the industry desperately needs 
money to invest in a thorough modern-
ization, whatever money the companies 
get is as likely to end up helping them 
get out of the industry as it is to help the 
industry. 
Many people see this pattern of 
investment as simply a matter of bad 
management. But the problem goes 
deeper than that. 
The management of American steel 
companies has been roundly (and 
justifiably) criticized for its ineptitude 
and incompetence in almost every area 
of management. They invested in new 
Open Hearth furnaces when BOFs were 
becoming the state of the art, and then 
spent millions of dollars in legal and 
political maneuvering to protect these 
polluting dinosaurs from environmental 
regulation. When they did begin to 
invest in the new generation of steel 
technology (only after they were well 
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behind the Japanese and other 
industries), they did so in a haphazard 
and piecemeal fashion: they built BOFs 
for rolling mills that could handle only a 
fraction of the new furnace's capacity, 
while at the same time putting con-
tinuous casters with Open Hearths that 
couldn't produce enough steel to keep 
the new casting systems busy. 
Steel companies are legendary for 
their authoritarian shopfloor work rela-
tions and production inefficiencies. And 
a U.S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO) study even found their 
marketing attitudes and procedures to 
be chasing U.S. customers away.* We 
are not, in a word, dealing with 
financial and production geniuses of the 
caliber of J.P. Morgan and Andrew 
Carnegie. 
But the lackluster record of steel 
managers has not been achieved in a 
vacuum. They manage an industry 
which no other country in the world 
allows to be run exclusively in the 
interests and by the lights of private 
management and investors. And they 
exist in the world's most unplanned 
economy where the allocation of 
resources is determined almost 
exclusively by yearly—and even 
quarterly—rates of return on invest-
ment. In such an economy you cannot 
expect the managers of steel companies 
to engage in far-sighted planning and 
* A good summary of these criticisms of American 
steel management can be found in Chapter 13 of 
Ira C. Magaziner and Robert B. Reich, Minding 
America's Business: The Decline and Rise of the 
American Economy (New York: Harcourt Brace, 
1982). The GAO study referred to is New Strategy 
Required for Aiding Distressed Steel Industry, January 
1981 (EMD-81-29). 
coordination of production and 
investment. 
Of all the differences between the 
U.S. industry and those in Japan and 
elsewhere, the most important is this: 
The Japanese steel industry is not 
expected to make a "competitive rate of 
return." Investment in that industry is 
ensured and coordinated by the govern-
ment as part of an overall economic 
plan. 
The American economy's exclusive 
reliance on short-term profit rates to 
allocate capital investment gives all U.S. 
corporations a certain character, as 
Nobel Prize winning economist Wassily 
Leontief has pointed out: 
During the past ten years American 
corporations earned an average of 18 
per cent on their investments while 
their Japanese counterparts earned 
only 11 per cent. This means that in 
the U.S. corporate managers are so 
cautious that they refuse to move 
until they can count on recovering 
newly invested capital in four and a 
half years. Managers in Japan are 
prepared to wait for eleven years. No 
wonder they continue to improve old 
plants and construct new ones while 
large U.S. corporations often prefer 
to maintain liquidity and to diversify 
their investments by buying up each 
other's stocks.* 
Most of the investment that's needed 
to modernize the American steel 
industry cannot be "recovered" in four 
and a half years. Though the companies 
must continue to invest in steel in order 
* New York Review of Books, August 12, 1982. 
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Profitability of the American 
Steel Industry is Higher Than 
Its Foreign Competitors 
(1969-1977 Fiscal Years) 
U.S.A. 
Japan 
Net Income as % < 
Net Fixed Assets 
West Germany 
United Kingdom 
France (1972-76) 
Source: International Iron and Steel Institute. 
6.7 
1.7 
2.9 
-5.3 
-8.3 
to protect existing assets, any extra 
money they get is going to go towards 
non-steel investments with higher and 
quicker rates of return. 
Even companies which have not 
engaged in extensive diversification in 
the past are likely to begin to position 
themselves to do so now. Bethlehem 
Steel, for example, has changed the 
composition of its board of directors in a 
way that many analysts believe 
prepares the company for a new non-
steel strategy; Bethlehem's president, in 
fact, has told the Wall Street Journal that 
"we've got to look at a strategy involv-
ing diversif icat ion."* Likewise, 
Republic has a new chairman who 
analysts describe as "just the man to 
push Republic to think about... 
diversification." * * 
This poses a cruel dilemma for 
steelworkers. The industry in which 
they work is in very serious trouble, and 
it needs help. Above all, it needs 
capital. But in the present arrangement, 
any additional capital, the companies get 
is not going to be enough to make steel 
*Wall Street Journal, July 22, 1980. 
**Business Week, August 9, 1982. 
"profitable" and the companies are, 
therefore, going to use a large part of it 
to finance their way out of the w ustry. 
Thus, not only would concessions on 
wages and work rules not help the 
industry. They more likely would 
facilitate its further decline. 
What is needed is a comprehensive 
program to save the industry from the 
companies and to protect the only 
people who have a direct stake in that 
industry: steelworkers and steel com-
munities. Unless these groups can 
develop an alternative plan for the 
industry and pursue that plan on 
several fronts, the companies will do for 
steel what Penn Central did for the 
railroads. 
Such an alternative plan would have 
to involve the federal government in an 
altogether new role. Supplying tax 
breaks and other unrestricted cash gifts 
to the companies will not help the 
industry. What is needed is what in 
other countries is called an industrial 
policy, an economic planning apparatus 
which distributes government loans, 
loan guarantees, tax benefits and direct 
subsidies only if companies invest in 
specific projects considered viable for the 
industry as a whole and in terms of an 
overall economic plan. 
In one form or another, every other 
steel industry in the world is subsidized 
by its national government, and invest-
ment in those industries is planned and 
coordinated by the government. Very 
often substantial portions of the 
industry are government-owned. 
Without a similar arrangement in the 
U.S., our industry will be steadily 
depleted of capital and technology, of 
jobs and of the payrolls so many com-
munities depend on. 
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A consensus is building towards such 
a planning approach to the U.S. 
economy. Important segments of 
business and of official labor (the AFL-
CIO Executive Committee, the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists and the 
United Steelworkers, for example) are 
advocating it. But such a planning 
apparatus can take many different 
shapes, serving many different 
interests. Steelworkers and steel com-
munities must become a part of plan-
ning their industry; they must initiate 
ways to wrest substantial portions of 
control of the industry away from the 
companies. The formation of an explicit 
government industrial policy can pro-
vide means and opportunities for 
encroaching on the entire range of 
"management perogatives." 
This will not be an easy task, but it is 
essential if steel is to remain an impor-
tant part of a vigorous industrial 
economy. That a steelworker-
community alternative plan for the 
industry can be devised and 
implemented may not seem like a 
realistic possibility now, but the ground 
rules of American politics and 
economics are changing rapidly. Merely 
to defend their existing, already 
deteriorated conditions, steelworkers 
and steel communities will have to take 
a more active role in managing their 
industry. 
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